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In response to the Power (1983) - Beattie (1984) controversy, a more general critique
of the construct of cognitive rhythms is presented. It is argued that the term itself is a mis-
nomer, that the relevance of articulation rate has been neglected, that fluent and hesitant
phases of cognitive rhythms have been assessed both subjectively and intuitively, that the
speech-production model underlying the concept is simplistic, and that the empirical evi-
dence is based on an extraordinarily small corpus which has been described inadequately in
the research literature.
For some years now, we have been uneasy about the scientific cogency of the evidence
for cognitive rhythms. We were therefore pleased to read Power’s (1983) experimental
critique. In the meantime, however, the discussion has taken on an all too ad hominem
tone (Beattie, 1984; Power, 1984). The reader will have to decide whether we are beating
a dead horse or a sacred cow that for many reasons refuses to die.
Let us return for a moment to the basic terminology. There is no legitimate sense in
which the iterations referred to as cognitive rhythms can appropriately be referred to as
rhythms. The principle of iterative regularity essential to a rhythm is completely lacking
in these phenomena. They are simply not rhythmical. Furthermore, great pains have been
taken to establish the reliable assessment of these cycles, without cogent evidence that
they validly reflect cognitive processes. The cognitive element has been assumed as a
necessary consequence of the fact that during speech, hesitant phases sometimes alternate
with fluent phases. Hence, cognitive rhythms have not been shown to be either rhyth-
mical or cognitive.
The relevance of articulation rate has also been completely neglected. There is
basically no way in which any kind of meaningful iterative speech chronometry can be
computed without some reference to articulation rate. It is, for example, quite possible
for a speaker to articulate the same number of syllables in a given (hesitant) phase with
much pausing as in an immediately following (fluent) phase. In fact, Dickerson’s (1971)
evidence of such a possibility has been neglected in discussions to date. The magic is
accomplished very simply by dramatic variation of articulation rate.
Cognitive rhythms have been identified by visual inspection of pause-time/speech-time
graphs. But there is no way of objectively and validly deciding, by visual inspection alone,
that a given slope reflects a hesitant or fluent phase. The size of the unit remains com-
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pletely subjective and intuitive, both in its &dquo;measurement&dquo; and in its inferred function.
The very first example of a hesitant phase in Figure 1 of Henderson, Goldman-Eisler, and
Skarbek (1965, p. 238), which has been reproduced in two subsequent publications
(Henderson, Goldman-Eisler and Skarbek, 1966; Goldman-Eisler, 1967), is an excellent
example of this subjectivity. The initial hesitant phase could obviously be further sub-
divided quite plausibly into a hesitant-fluent-hesitant sequence. What the actual spoken
text in question might suggest in this regard has never so much as been mentioned.
Butterworth and Goldman-Eisler (1979) have described the model of speech produc-
tion on which the concept of cognitive rhythms relies as consisting of two identifiable
stages, planning and execution, corresponding to the hesitant and fluent phase of a cycle:
&dquo;Stage 1: A plan is formulated ... Stage 2: The plan is executed&dquo; (p. 211). But it is quite
possible that a given phase of hesitancy reflects, for example, retrospective thinking.
The model is obviously too simple. Butterworth and Goldman-Eisler’s identification
of cognitive rhythms in oral reading is also problematic in view of this model. In oral
reading, hesitancy obviously reflects rhetorical intent rather than planning; the text to
be communicated is given, not something to be planned or formulated.
What is to be said of the corpus from which the evidence for cognitive rhythms has
been derived? First of all, it is extraordinarily small. It is literally impossible to say how
small it is, because the operational descriptions of data have been so poorly presented.
For example, one cannot decipher from Henderson et al. ( 1965) whether the study is
actually a within-subject (N = 5) or a between-subject (N = 10) study. Cross references
to subjects from one study to another are also quite confusing, e.g., between Butterworth
and Beattie (1978) and Beattie (1980).
Nowhere in the extant literature have we found any convincing evidence of cognitive
rhythms as a useful scientific concept as claimed by its proponents. Conceptualization of
the temporal macro-structure of oral discourse remains a challenge for psycholinguistic
research.
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